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In early 1975, when Richard Frank Adams, a United States citizen,
and Anthony Corbett Sullivan, an Australian citizen, obtained a
marriage license from the Boulder, Colorado county clerk, they
thought their immigration worries were over. Four days after they
were married by a minister, Adams petitioned the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) for adjustment of Sullivan's status from
that of a non-immigrant visitor to that of a permanent resident alien
"immediate relative."' The INS, and subsequently the Bureau of
Immigration Appeals, rejected the petition, holding that the rele-
vant portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or the
Act) did not apply to gay persons.2 The federal courts affirmed,3
and Sullivan was ordered deported.
I will argue here that the INS should accord preference status to
approve and expedite immigration not only for heterosexual aliens
married to American citizens but also for gay aliens in domestic rela-
tionships with American citizens. 4 It is true that gay marriage per se
1. Section 204 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as amended, 8
U.S.C. § 1154, establishes procedures for granting "immediate relative" status. This
section has recently been supplemented by the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments of 1986, infra note 7, which probably will affect many couples applying for prefer-
ence status after 1986. "Immediate relatives" are defined as: "children, spouses, and
parents of a citizen of the United States ... [who are] otherwise qualified for admission
as immigrants." INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b). The term "spouse," which is generally used
throughout the the INA, is not specifically defined, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35).
2. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1120-21 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir. 1981); cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982). See also Note, Adams v. Howerton:
Avoiding Constitutional Challenges to Immigration Policies Through Judicial Deference, 13 GOLDEN
GATE L. REV. 318 (1983) and Note, The Invalidation of a Homose<xual .1arriage for Inmigra-
tion Purposes, Adams v. Howerton, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 267 (1983).
Gay domestic relationships are valid for immigration preference purposes in at least
one country. "The Australian Immigration Service will now award permanent residency
status to non-Australians who are in a 'genuine gay relationship' of at least four years
duration with an Australian citizen." BAR Ass'N FOR HUM. RTS. OF GREATER N.Y., LES-
BIAN/GAY LAw NOTES, Nov. 1986, at 66 [hereinafter LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES]. See also
Westheimer, but only if it's 'genuine', Gay Community News, Sept. 21-27, 1986, at 2, col. 2.
3. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd 673 F.2d 1036 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
4. Throughout this paper, I use the term "gay" rather than "homosexual." I avoid
the word "homosexual" because many gay and lesbian persons are offended by its
clinical and historical overtones. "Gay and lesbian" would be the preferable phrase
were it not so cumbersome to repeat in a lengthy paper. Unless stated otherwise, "gay"
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is not recognized as valid anywhere in the United States, and the
number of gay persons affected by this more general denial sur-
passes that of those affected by the immigration laws. However,
"thousands, if not hundreds of thousands' '5 of gay couples are, like
Adams and Sullivan, adversely affected by the immigration laws.
These couples often live in the shadow of a prospect unknown to
their heterosexual married counterparts or even to gay citizen
couples: the possibility of forced separation through exclusion or
deportation. For these reasons, the immigration dilemma of these
couples deserves careful and separate attention.
The INS's traditional justifications for establishing a preference
for family relationships - the preservation of family unity and the
prevention of the hardship of separation - are just as compelling
for gay persons as they are for heterosexual persons. Gay domestic
relationships are receiving greater recognition from courts and
other institutions in our society today. Moreover, the INS has al-
ways exercised considerable flexibility in molding its immigration
policies on personal and domestic matters to fit changing societal
realities. I will here explore the policy and legal questions raised by
the INS' failure to recognize gay domestic relationships for immi-
gration purposes, and propose a sensible, effective policy that the
INS should adopt to remedy this failure.
I. The Web and the Isolate.- The Double Vision of the INA
Central to any understanding of United States immigration policy
is an acknowledgment of the INA's orientation toward the concept
of "relationship." With an almost tedious uniformity, the statute
treats individuals not as isolated nodes but as matter embedded in a
web of significant relationships. Family unity (or reunification), es-
pecially, is an overriding theme of our immigration laws. This
refers to both gay men and lesbians. "Gay," however, is always used adjectivally, as are
"heterosexual" and other such terms, in recognition that a person is much more than
her or his sexual orientation.
By "domestic relationship" I mean a de facto marriage between persons of the same
sex. The existence of such a relationship is a matter of the subjective perception of the
couple, but it can also be objectively verified. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying
text.
5. Telephone interview with Urvashi Vaid, Information Officer, National Gay Task
Force, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1986) [hereinafter Vaid Interview]. Ms. Vaid notes
that while exact figures are extremely difficult to gather, the INS' refusal to recognize
gay domestic relationships as valid for immigration purposes potentially affects every
alien entering the country, those who consider themselves to be gay persons as well as
those who might discover that they are; that is, theoretically at least, any alien, while in
the United States, may meet someone of the same sex with whom the alien wishes to




theme surely reflects a deep-seated belief in the centrality of stable,
primary relationships to both the individual and the state.
6
The most highly privileged family relationship of immigration law
is marriage to a United States citizen. Indeed, the law accords an
alien spouse of a United States citizen or legal permanent resident
alien substantial and unique protections. 7 For example, an alien
spouse of a United States citizen is not subject to the quota and
labor certification requirements of the INA, 8 U.S.C § 1153.8 In ad-
dition, the alien spouse of a legal permanent resident is placed in
the second of six preference categories for immigrant admission,9 in
which chances of gaining entry are considerably higher than in the
four remaining categories.' 0 Similarly, spouses of refugees" and
asylees12 are automatically accorded the immigration status of their
wives or husbands. Alien spouses of United States citizens or legal
6. See, e.g., SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, FINAL REPORT 111, 112-35 (1981); Kaliski v. District
Dir., INS, 620 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980); H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. 7
(1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2016-2029.
7. In general, the U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident alien relative of the alien
applies for these benefits by petition. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS Form 1-130,
Petition to Classify Status of Alien Relative for Issuance of Immigrant Visa. The latest
amendments to the INA, passed at the end of the 99th Congress, do not disturb the
relationship preferences and in fact make it easier for World Bank employees, fathers of
illegitimate children, and others to establish relative status for family members. 44
CONG. Q, Oct. 18, 1986, at 2597-98. See generally IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL
ACT OF 1986, reprinted in C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, I IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 1-55 [hereinafter GORDON & ROSENFIELD]. However, the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.), will make obtaining informative preference benefits more diffi-
cult in many other cases. For instance, § 2 of the Amendments imposes a new two-year
"conditional" legal permanent resident status on alien sons and daughters who obtain
that status by virtue of a marriage that is less than 24 months old. Conditional status
may be terminated by the Attorney General on an initial or subsequent finding of fraud
or marital termination, or for lateness in filing an application for change of status, re-
fusal to be interviewed at the end of the conditional period, or an adverse determination
based on the interview. A hardship waiver is available, but only for circumstances "oc-
curring... during the period that the alien was admitted for permanent residence on a
conditional basis" (including termination of the marriage by the alien spouse "for good
cause"). Section 3 of the Amendments makes it more difficult for persons engaged to be
married to obtain adjustment of their status from nonimmigrants to legal permanent
resident aliens, and § 2 also makes it more difficult for aliens who obtained legal perma-
nent resident status through marriage to obtain a second preference petition for a sub-
sequent spouse. Nor can aliens in deportation or exclusion proceedings any longer
receive special consideration simply by marrying a citizen, under § 5 of the
Amendments.
8. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), 1151(b).
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2).
10. Danilov & Nerheim, The Status of Aliens Married to. or Divorced fivm. American Citi-
zens, 30 PRAC. LAW., June 1, 1984, at 54.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c).
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permanent residents who willfully or otherwise violate our immigra-
tion laws may receive special favorable consideration in exclusion or
deportation proceedings. 13 Moreover, alien spouses can be natural-
ized more quickly than other immigrants14 and may use their marital
status to bring other family members into the country.' 5
Furthermore, for immigration purposes, the INS has established a
strong presumption in favor of the validity of a marriage; 16 for ex-
ample, regulations prescribe that common law marriages are
deemed valid for immigration purposes if such relationships are rec-
ognized in the couple's resident state.17 Our immigration law's em-
phasis on marital affiliation goes even further by recognizing tribal
and other so-called customary marriages, t8 as well as Unification
Church ("Moonie") proxy marriages, although the INA maintains a
strong presumption against the validity of proxy marriage. 19 Of
course, marriage undertaken solely for the purpose of circum-
venting the immigration laws will not be considered valid.20
13. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (discretionary adjustment of status of otherwise ex-
cludable refugees "to assure family unity"); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1182(i) (discretionary
waivers of exclusion for family members for mental or physical disability, marihuana
possession, fraudulent possession of a visa); 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (discretionary sus-
pension of deportation that would result in "extreme hardship to the alien or to his
spouse ... who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence"). Cf. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (government must con-
sider the gravity of individual's interest in remaining with her immediate family in
exclusion procedings). But see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953) (exclusion despite family ties and long residence in the United States); United
States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 357 (1950) (same). See also Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, supra note 7, § 4 (aliens who marry while in de-
portation or exclusion proceedings not eligible for alien immediate relative status or
preference status).
14. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1430(a) and 1430(b).
15. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) (visas for unmarried sons and daughters of U.S.
citizens); 8 U.S.C. § 1 153(a)(2) (similar provision regarding unmarried children of legal
permanent resident aliens); 8 U.S.C. § 1 153(a)(5) (fifth-preference visa for brothers and
sisters of United States citizens); Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986,
supra note 7, § 2 (conditional permanent resident status for certain alien sons and
daughters).
16. Konoweicki, How to Immigrate to the United States: A Practical Guide for the Attorney,
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 193, 212 (1976). But see Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments of 1986, supra note 7, § 2 (imposing stricter controls on granting relative prefer-
ence status).
17. See 3 IMM. L. SERV. § 36.2 (1986); Danilov & Nerheim, supra note 10, at 55.
18. See, e.g., In re L., 7 Immigration and Nationalization Decisions 587 (BIA 1957)
(customary Chinese marriage valid for immigration purposes); III re Agbulos, 13 Immi-
gration and Nationalization Decisions 393 (Dist. Dir. 1969) (marriage by Philippine tri-
bal custom valid for immigration purposes).
19. Interview with Christine Peterson, Supervisory INS Examiner, in New York City
(May 5, 1986) [hereinafter Peterson Interview]. See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(35); see also
3 IMM. L. SERV. § 36.3 and nn.12-15 (1986).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c). See generally Current Topic, Regulating'Administrati'e Discretion:




The web of significant relationships which forms the context for
evaluation of most aliens' entry applications is, however, swept away
for gay aliens. Both the INA and the INS seem to envision gay per-
sons a-contextually, as isolated "deviates" from whom the country
must be protected. Two exclusion provisions, both based on pre-
entry conduct, are generally relied on to deny entry to gay aliens.
First, § 1182(a)(9) of the INA excludes aliens who were convicted of
a crime involving "moral turpitude" or "who admit committing acts
which constitute the essential elements of such a crime." 2' Even
though the presumptive act of moral turpitude might have been
legal in the country in which it occurred, it is nonetheless judged by
prevailing U.S. standards. 22 The broad language of § 1182(a)(9)
would seem to spell trouble for any entering homosexual alien.
However, the provision apparently has never been read as a blanket
ground for exclusion of all gay persons.23
Far more significant is 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(4), which excludes
"[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation,
or a mental defect." 24 This provision has its origins in the Immigra-
tion Act of 1917, which excluded all aliens "of constitutional psy-
chopathic personality."2 5 This was a medically precise term of the
riage Fraud Amendments of 1986, supra note 7, § 2(d)(2) (criminal penalties, including
fines and imprisonment, for immigration marriage fraud).
21. In Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) the Supreme Court rejected a chal-
lenge to the "moral turpitude" provision of the Immigration Act of 1917, essentially
similar to the current provision, on the ground that it was "void for vagueness." The
term first appeared in the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084. 341 U.S. at 229 n.14. C.
Gordon and E.G. Gordon note that "[a]ttempts to arrive at a workable definition of
moral turpitude never have yielded entire satisfaction," but that for immigration pur-
poses "a conspiracy to commit a crime or an attempt to commit a crime or being acces-
sory to a crime will involve moral turpitude only if the basic crime does." C. GORDON &
E.G. GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAw: STUDENT EDITION § 4.13 (1984).
22. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.43c.
23. See IA GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at §§ 4.13-4.14b; 1 GORDON & Ro-
SENFIELD, supra note 7, §§ 2.43b-2.23c.
24. Theoretically, 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(13) is also available to exclude gay aliens, at
least those entering in some states. That section excludes "[alliens coming to the
United States to engage in any immoral sexual act." In fact, this provision is targeted to
the activities of prostitutes and pimps and "to activities similar to prostitution; more-
over, it excludes only those whose primary reason for entry is the immoral purpose so
defined. I GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.44b. This provision apparently
has never been used to exclude gay aliens.
25. Pub. L. No. 64-301 § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917). See also itfra note 26, for medi-
cal definitions of "constitutional psychopathic personality." No one knows how many
gay aliens may have entered before passage of this statute. Evidence suggests, though,
that in the 18th and 19th centuries the United States was seen as a haven for gay persons
seeking refuge from persecution or embarrassment in their native land. SeeJ. KATZ, GAY
AMERICAN HISTORY at 37-39, 48; 645, n.12 (1979).
Because the history of the exclusion and expulsion of gay aliens has been exhaustively
covered elsewhere, what follows is a broad overview. For comprehensive background
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day that included, but was not limited to, gay persons.2 6 Subse-
quent changes in the language of the "gay exclusion" also tracked
evolving medical terminology. 27 The term "sexual deviation," as
used in the last amendment of the provision in 1965, reflects stan-
dard medical terminology of that date. 28
Nevertheless, in the 1967 case of Boutillier v. INS, the Supreme
Court held the phrase "sexual deviation" to be a legal term of art
that evinced Congress' legitimate intent to exclude all gay aliens
from entry into the country for any length of time. 29 The case con-
cerned the naturalization petition of, and subsequent deportation
proceedings against, a Canadian alien who admitted to having "ho-
mosexual relations" both before and after entry. The Public Health
works, see Developments in the Law - Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1286, 1342-46 (1983); Fowler & Graff, Gay Aliens and Immigration: Resolving the Con-
flict Between Hill and Longstaff, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 621 (1985); Note, The Immigration
and Nationality Act and the Exclusion of Homosexuals: Boutillier v. INS Revisited, 2 CARDOZO L.
REV. 359 (1981); Note, The Exclusion and Expulsion of Homosexual Aliens, 15 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 295 (1984); Note, The Propriety of Denying Entry to Homosexual Aliens: Examin-
ing the Public Health Service s Authority over Medical Exclusions, 17 MICH. J.L. REF. 331 (1984);
Note, 'Psychopathic Personality' and 'Sexual Deviation': Medical Terms or Legal Catch-Alls -
Analysis of the Status of the Homosexual Alien, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 328 (1967).
26. The MANUAL OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF ALIENS issued by the United
States Public Health Service in 1918 contains the following explanation under the head-
ing Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority:
But aside from those showing defective intelligence, there is an important group in
the borderland between sanity and insanity who are "failures of mental adaptation"
and have a tendency to become actively disordered. In this class are the constitu-
tional psychopaths and inferiors, the moral imbeciles, the pathological liars and
swindlers, the defective delinquents, many of the vagrants and cranks, and persons
with abnormal sexual instincts.
The dividing line between these various types is not well defined, and for purposes
of simplicity in classifying the mentally abnormal immigrant they may all be in-
cluded in one general class and certified as cases of constitutional psychopathic
inferiority.
Cited in Note, 'Psychopathic Personality' and 'Sexual Deviation', supra note 25, at 328-29. See
also Note, The Immigration and Nationality Act and the Exclusion of Homosexuals, supra note 25,
at 97:
"Constitutional psychopathic inferior" was a contemporary medical classification
for individuals "who show a lifelong and constitutional tendency not to conform to
the customs of the group." They were persons who "habitually misbehave.., have
no sense of responsibility to their fellow-men or to society as a whole ... succumb
readily to the temptation of getting easy money through a life of crime ... [and] fail
to learn by experience." Their condition was "constitutional" in that it was "inher-
ent in their nervous structure" and was "present at birth." [citations omitted]
27. See generally Note, 'Psychopathic Personality' and 'Sexual Deviation,' supra note 25.
28. Id. See also S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., I st Sess. 18, 19 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3328-3327. In the House, Rep. Ryan noted that "the
old law [has] been clarified and made to conform to recent advances in medical science."
Ill CONG. REC. 21,782 (1965).




Service (PHS) had issued to Boutillier the requisite "Class A" certi-
fication of excludability on medical grounds.
30
Since the case centered on the petitioner's challenge to the accu-
racy of his certification as a "sexual deviate," 3' the holding was
broader than the facts required it to be. That is, the Court could
simply have held that since Boutillier had received the relevant certi-
fication for exclusion in accordance with established procedures, he
could be excluded. Moreover, the Court, in its apparent haste to
confirm Congress' "plenary powers" over immigration, ignored a
crucial fact: that in all of its debates over the wording of INA
§ 212(a)(4), Congress never moved the "gay exclusion" outside of
the list of medical, as opposed to philosophical or criminal, exclu-
sions.3 2 Congress' inaction strongly suggests that it meant the ex-
clusion of gay persons to be governed by changing medical
knowledge.
33
Current INS Operations Instructions (operating rules for officers,
examiners and administrators), 34 while ostensibly implementing the
30. Whether the relevant provisions of the INA (principally, §§ 232-34) require the
use of Class A certification to exclude homosexuality is a subject of dispute among the
circuit courts. See Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm. v. USINS, 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D.
Cal. 1982), aff'd in part and vacated in part, sub. nom. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.
1983) (INA requires PHS certification for exclusion); In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1219 (1984) (PHS certification provision of INA discre-
tionary). The issue is of more than technical interest, since PHS, in conformity with
changing medical standards, has refused since 1979 to issue Class A certificates to
homosexuals. (In 1973 the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality
from its list of mental disorders, see Note, The Propriety of Denying Entry to Homosexual
Aliens, supra note 25, at 331.) Recently, the U.S. Attorney General's office instructed the
Department of Health and Human Services, PHS' parent agency, that it is required by
the INA to issue Class A certificates to "self-proclaimed homosexual aliens" entering
within the Ninth Circuit. Letter from Acting Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen to Dr.
Edward N. Brandt, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Health, Dep't of Health and Human Serv-
ices (Apr. 5, 1986), 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 378 (1986) [hereinafter Jensen Letter].
31. Brief for Petitioner at 8, 29-33, Boutillier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
32. Cf. supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. The 1986 immigration amend-
ments leave the language and placement of the 1965 amendment ("sexual perversion")
untouched.
33. See Note, The Propriety of Denying Ent" to Homosexual Aliens, supra note 25, at 351.
34. See INS Operations Instructions 235.8, App. 01, reprinted in 4 GORDON & ROSEN-
FIELD, supra note 7, at 23-466.9. See also Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to David L. Cross-
land, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Dec. 10, 1979, re-
printed in 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 569, 572 (1979) (continued enforcement of
§ 212(a)(4) despite PHS refusal to certify) [hereinafter Harmon Memorandum]; Memo-
randum from Andrew J. Carmichael, Jr., Associate Commissioner, Examinations, Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, to Regional Commissioners, Feb. 7, 1985 (confirms
this policy) [hereinafter Carmichael Memorandum]; Jensen Letter, supra note 30.
However, Scott Blackman, Deputy Director for Deportation of the INS' New York City
regional office, acknowledged that the policy is "toothless." Interview with Scott
Blackman, in New York City, (May 5, 1986). Recently, though, the INS began exclusion
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broad mandate of Boutillier, in fact underscore its lack of viability.
An alien is excluded from entry as a gay person only if, at the port of
entry, he or she makes a "voluntary, unsolicited and unambiguous"
admission of homosexuality and repeats that statement to a second
inspecting officer. 35 In other words, "in order to gain admission to
the country homosexuals must deny their orientation and thereby
collude in a farcical transaction." 36 Exact figures are hard to obtain,
but this policy ensures the entry into the country of many thousands
of gay aliens every year.
3 7
Thus, not only are the current procedures demeaning to both INS
officers and gay aliens, but they are also ineffective. 38 Privacy con-
cerns, a tight budget and more pressing enforcement priorities such
as border control make it unlikely that the INS would be willing to,
or could, successfully pursue a more vigorous program. However,
the INS appears unlikely to scrap the policy entirely. 39
Although unsatisfactory, the regulations relating to gay aliens il-
lustrate an important, often overlooked point concerning Congress'
broad powers over immigration: the INS has considerable flexibility
in the quotidian implementation of INA provisions, and particularly
in the definition of the Act's more subjective terms. In response to
changing social mores, for example, the INS has abandoned its pol-
icy of treating cohabitation without marriage as a per se instance of
"bad moral character" that will defeat a naturalization petition. 40 It
proceedings under § 212(a)(4) against a number of Cuban "Marielitos" who admitted to
having been jailed in Cuba for homosexual activity. LESBIAN/GAY LAw NOTES, Oct.
1986, at 59.
35. See Carmichael Memorandum, supra note 34.
36. E. HULL, WITHouTrJUSTICE FOR ALL 65 (1986).
37. According to the Kinsey Institute, 9.3% of Americans have had significant homo-
sexual experiences. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Per-
sons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 800 n.4 (1979). A more recent study puts
the figure at between 8-15%, see Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S.
1009, 1014 n.7 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting from denial of petition for certiorari), citing
HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL (J. Marmor ed. 1980). In 1983 alone,
9,849,485 nonimmigrants were admitted into the country. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1983
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR THE INS, Table NIM 2.1, at 125. Immigrants aside, and as-
suming that only a mere 3% of entering nonimmigrant aliens are gay persons, approxi-
mately 206,000 gay persons can be assumed to have entered the United States in 1983
alone. Cf infra note 112 and accompanying text.
38. E. HULL, supra note 36, at 65.
39. See Carmichael Memorandum, supra note 34; Jensen Letter, supra note 30.
40. See generally Roberts, Sex and the Immigration Laws, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1976).
Roberts notes correctly that the INS' attitude toward fornication as an index of bad
moral character has undergone some liberalization. Id. at 35-37. While the INS' atti-
tude regarding homosexuality remains relatively unchanged, the courts have held that
homosexuality is not a per se index of "bad moral character" for purposes of obtaining
citizenship. See Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1980); In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp.




has also allowed certain non-conventional marriages, such as some
proxy marriages, to stand as valid for immigration purposes. 4 1
Moreover, the INS has even evolved a policy allowing for the tem-
porary admission of certain openly gay aliens. 42 In short, the INS
has exercised considerable adaptability in the past and could there-
fore, absent express statutory prohibition, legally recognize gay do-
mestic relationships as valid for immigration purposes if it
determined that doing so would not violate current social mores.
43
II. Marriage and Homosexuality
Gay people are commonly stereotyped as being "anti-marriage"
and "anti-family." 44 In fact, while some gay persons have abjured
marriage as an institution of patriarchal privilege,45 many others
have sought the right to marry.46 The reasons are not difficult to
understand. Beyond its many material advantages, "[m]arriage is
generally viewed as strengthening the stability, emotional health,
and social respectability of a relationship between two people." 4
7
Additionally, marriage and family relationships are widely assumed
to foster the "ability independently to define one's identity that is
central to any concept of liberty."
'4 8
41. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
42. "[In the case of a nonimmigrant ["sexual deviant"], a medical examination
should not be required if, in spite of the alien's admission [of "sexual deviancy"], the
facts of the case would support a recommendation that the alien's temporary admission
be authorized under the provisions of INA § 212 (d)(3)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A)]
[admission of otherwise excludable consular officers]." 1 IMMIGRATION L. SERV. § 4:16.
43. "It may reasonably be inferred that Congress intended homosexuality to be de-
fined in light of current knowledge and social mores." Harmon Memorandum, supra
note 34, at 581.
44. A common charge in this regard is that gay persons, particularly gay men, are
child molesters or otherwise "prey on youth." See, e.g., J. KAxz, supra note 25, at 124,
393; cf. Note, The Exclusion and Expulsion of Homosexual Aliens, supra note 25, at 328 and
nn.249-51. As one commentator has remarked, "It is a bizarre underestimation of the
attractions of family life to suppose that the legitimacy of homosexuality as a way of life
would have any effect on it at all." Id. at 329, quoting Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121,
1131 (N.D. Tex. 1982). For a list of authorities who maintain that gay relationships are
inherently "corrupt," see Delgado, Fact, Norm, and Standard of Review - The Case of Homo-
sexuality, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 575, 586 n.90 (1985).
45. See, e.g., A. RicH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD As EXPERIENCE AND INSTITU-
TION, 48-49, 63 (1976); M. DALY, PURE LUST: ELEMENTAL FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY, 57, 157,
318, 378 passim (1984).
46. See generally J. KATZ, supra note 25, at 53-58, 225-26, passim.
47. Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to Ala y - 1Ihy 'Cant Fred
Marry George - Or M'ary and Alice at the Same Time?, 10J. CONTEMP. L. 33, 37 (1984). See
also Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624, 651 (1980); Note, Homosex-
uals' Right to Manrry: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193,
197 and nn.25-26; Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE LJ. 573, 580 &
nn.35-36 (1973).
48. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984),
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The courts have found no "fundamental" right to marry for gay
persons, as they have for heterosexual persons. 49 Nevertheless, gay
people have always entered into marital-type domestic relationships,
and appear to be doing so in growing numbers. 50  Such relation-
ships have been shown to be virtually identical in their psychology
to heterosexual marriages. 5' Moreover, gay domestic relationships
are beginning to resemble heterosexual arrangements in other ways
as well. Although a traditional justification for confining marriage
to heterosexual persons has been the belief that marriage is
designed primarily for procreative purposes, 52 new reproductive
technology challenges this notion. 53 Thus, in the near future many
gay relationships may also revolve around begetting and raising
children.
49. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 374 (1978) (right to marry is "fundamental");
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (state statute may legitimately limit mar-
riage to male-female couples).
50. Interview with Judith Turkel, Board Member of Lambda Legal Defense and Edu-
cation Fund and Bar Association for Human Rights (New York City), in New York City
(Mar. 15, 1986) [hereinafter Turkel Interview]. The number of publications of main-
stream presses that include sections offering advice on gay marital arrangements is an-
other indication of their growing popularity. See, e.g., P. ASHLEY, OH PROMISE ME, BUT
PUT IT IN WRITING: LIVING-TOGETHER ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER
MARRIAGE 72-78 &passim (1978); L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: A GUIDE TO
LIVING WITH LOVERS AND SPOUSES (1981); N.O.W./LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND
& R. CHEROW-O'LEARY, THE STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS (1987).
See also H. CURRY & C. DENIS, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN COUPLES (1980).
51. Note, Homosexuals' Right to Marry, supra note 47, at 197-98 and nn.26-28, 31.
52. See Dayton, Same-Sex Marriage. The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541, 541
(1985); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 479 (1965); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. at
1124-25.
53. See generally Winkler, Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The Femi-
nist Perspectives, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043 (1986); Note, Reproductive Technology and the Pro-
creation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1985); Somerville, Birth Technology,
Parenting, and 'Deviance, '" 5 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCH. 123 (1982); Kritchevsky, The Unmarried
Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1981).
One gay rights lawyer estimated that she has met one lesbian or gay couple a month
who wished to establish legal protections for a child to be born by donor insemination
or other nontraditional means. She asserts that other lawyers dealing with same-sex
couples have also reported an increasing number of requests for domestic relations legal
services related to children born by nontraditional means. Turkel Interview, supra note
51. An early study estimates that "there are well over 1.5 million lesbian mothers in this
country." Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian M'others: Legal Theories and Litigation
Strategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 691, 191 (1976). See also Herman, Lesbians & Kids: Commu-
nity We Create, Gay Community News, May 24, 1986, at 6, cols. 1-5 ("lesbian baby
boom"); C. PIES, CHOOSING PARENTHOOD: A WORKBOOK FOR LESBIANS (1985); and infra
note 59.
Almost all of the scholarly literature on homosexuals' right to marry ignores this
trend. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 47, at 684; Note, Homosexuals' Right to MAor, supra note
47, at 201; Note, Legality of Homosexual Marriage, supra note 47, at 578.
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Discrimination against gay persons may still be widespread and
often virulent. Courts following traditional precedents have been
hostile to the notion of same-sex marriage, and have even dispar-
aged the worth of same-sex relationships. 54 In Baker v. Nelson, for
example, the Supreme Court dismissed for want of a substantial fed-
eral question a suit over whether a gay couple could be denied a
marriage license.55 Similarly, the district court in Adams dismissed
the plaintiff's due process claim by noting approvingly that "there
has been for centuries a combination of scriptural and canonical
teaching under which a 'marriage' between persons of the same sex
was unthinkable and, by definition, impossible." 56 Moreover, state
legislatures and courts have been uniformly resistant to the notion
of state-sanctioned gay marriage.
Inroads into anti-gay prejudice that were unthinkable ten or even
five years ago, however, are appearing with some frequency. Com-
mentators continue to be critical of court decisions such as Baker
and Adams, questioning their constitutionality and their durability as
sound precedent. 57 Moreover, some state courts have shown a re-
markable willingness to reject the traditional hostility toward gay
persons. While they have stopped short of finding a fundamental
right to marry for gay persons, they have expressed their willingness
to concede not only the existence of gay long-term primary commit-
ments but also the intrinsic value of such commitments. 5 8 For ex-
ample, a California court recently allowed a lesbian couple of seven
years' standing to adopt a child.59 A gay man in New York whose
54. See generally Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra note 37, at 874-908; Rivera,
Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311, 324-36 (1980-81). One
commentator has suggested that the root of this hostility may be the "questionable
premise" that "two, and only two, distinct and immutable sexes exist." Dunlap, The
Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the Mlfale/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 1131, 1131 (1979).
55. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). See
also Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (refusing marriage license
to gay couple).
56. 486 F. Supp. at 1123.
57. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 47, at 686; Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra note
37, at 908.
58. See generally Rivera, Recent Developments, supra note 54, at 324-36 for an account of
developing law regarding gay domestic relationships in such areas as child custody,
wills, and property settlements. The examples that follow in the text primarily are those
that have occurred subsequent to the publication of this article by Rivera.
59. LESBIAN/GAY LAw NOTES, Apr. 1986, at 24. See also Two Assoc. v. Brown, 502
N.Y.S. 2d 604, 607 (1986), in which Judge Helen Freedman noted in the context of a
suit by a gay man to retain custody of his recently deceased male domestic partner's
child:
To deem ... collateral relatives, some of whom have no blood relationship to each
other, family members and to deprive the instant defendant, who has provided care
195
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 5:185, 1986
domestic partner had recently died was awarded the highly coveted
"relative" status for purposes of retaining their apartment. 60 In ad-
dition, "[t]he D[istrict of] C[olumbia] City Council Judiciary Com-
mittee has given approval to a 'durable power of attorney' law,
which has been hailed by local gay activists as a valuable tool to al-
low gay significant others to play the role of family members in med-
ical emergencies." 6' Gay people have received worker's
compensation benefits to tend partners who are ill,62 and wills by
gay people leaving estates to partners are no longer routinely disre-
garded. 63 Indeed, through contractual arrangements involving
property rights, power of attorney, domestic partnership agree-
ments, and the like, gay couples can secure a kind of quasi-common
law marital status and thereby obtain many of the legal protections
accorded by right to heterosexual couples.
64
Largely through the efforts of gay rights lawyers and activists,
these advances have not stopped at the courtroom. A few munici-
palities have extended insurance and other city benefits to "domes-
tic partners." 65  Insurance companies and automobile clubs
voluntarily are extending marital benefits privileges to same-sex
and love through both a serious illness and death, of family member status would
indeed be an arbitrary way to define family ... there is no rational reason for sepa-
rate classification ... there is no rational reason to exclude persons in [the defend-
ant's] situation from being classified as a family member, when in fact, the
relationship was much closer than that of many family members.
See also In re Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S. 2d 198, 200 (1982) (adoption of adult male
by his homosexual partner promotes the "moral and temporal interests" of both). In
California, a gay man recently was awarded custody of his 15-year-old son by the San
Diego Superior Court, and the Washington State Court of Appeals recently struck a trial
court order prohibiting a child from visiting his father in the father's gay lover's pres-
ence. LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, Summer 1986, at 43. Most recently, the Massachusetts
Superior Court, in a strongly-worded rebuke to Gov. Michael Dukakis' administration,
permitted two gay men to challenge as "irrational" and "arbitrary" a Department of
Social Services regulation categorizing foster parents by sexual orientation and giving
preference to heterosexual persons. 15 MASS. L.W. 17 (1986).
60. Two Assoc. v. Brown, 502 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1986), appeal docketed. Two Assoc. v.
Brown, Nos. M-3862, M-3899, M-3904, M-3907, slip op. (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 9, 1986).
61. LESBIAN/GAY LAw NOTES, Summer 1986, at 43.
62. A Success Story: Obtaining 'Domestic-Partner Benefits,' Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1986, at
37, col. 3.
63. See Rivera, Recent Developments, supra note 54, at 325-26.
64. See P. ASHLEY, L. WEITZMAN, H. CURRY & C. DENIS, and N.O.W. & CHEROW-
O'LEARY, all cited supra note 50.
65. Currently, Berkeley, California and West Hollywood, California have such laws.
Vaid Interview, supra note 5. Significantly, "for the first time, the national board of the
[American Civil Liberties Union] has adopted a formal policy statement endorsing gay
and lesbian marriage and the provision of spouse benefits to gay couples .... [T]he
ACLU is probably the first mainstream civil rights group to take such a position." LES-
BIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, Nov. 1986, at 66.
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couples.66 Some real estate agencies and banks are willing to pro-
vide their services to the same-sex couple as a unit. 67 Religious or-
ganizations - such as the Catholic "Dignity" group, the
Metropolitan Community Church (Protestant), and gay-oriented
synagogues - help to provide committed same-sex couples with ac-
ceptance and a sense of place within the religious community. In
sum, to many gay persons, the concept of marriage is as important
as it is for heterosexual persons, for both the personal and societal
benefits it can bestow. Courts and other social institutions are
slowly beginning to accord legitimacy to same-sex marital-type ar-
rangements, and are likely to continue to do so.
68
III. The Problem with Current INS Policy
Denying preference status to gay aliens violates basic principles of
justice and fairness. It also violates the constitutional requirement
of equal protection, which provides that similarly situated groups
may not be arbitrarily distinguished in law.69 The individual liberty
interests of gay persons seeking immigration preference status for
domestic partners is in many ways substantially similar, if not identi-
cal, to that of heterosexual persons seeking a marital preference.
First, once they have entered the country, all aliens have a substan-
tial "liberty interest" in remaining here.70 This interest encom-
passes both the right "to stay and live and work in this land of
freedom" 7' and the right to continue with one's family.7 2 Loss of
66. A Success Story: Obtaining 'Domestic-Partner Benefits', supra note 62, at 37, cols. 2-3.
67. Id.
68. But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 54 U.S.L.W. 4919, reh'g denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3228
(1986) (states may proscribe private, consensual homosexual sodomy). The full effect of
Bowers is difficult to foresee. While progress toward gay rights may be slowed on the
federal level, see, e.g., Walsh v. Missouri, 713 S.W.2d 508 (1986) (proscription of homo-
sexual sodomy does not abridge fourteenth amendment rights), it is still likely to go
forward on state and local levels, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 86M859, Fay-
ette County Dist. Ct., Ky, reported in LESBIAN/GAY LAw NOTES, Dec. 1986, at 71 (consen-
sual sodomy statute unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds).
69. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (state cannot deny public education to
children based on their status as illegal aliens).
70. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (legal aliens have a
liberty interest in civil service employment); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (exclud-
able aliens have an interest in remaining with their families in the U.S.); Fernandez-
Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'das modified, 781 F.2d 1450 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (Mariel boatlift parolees have a liberty interest in immigration parole); Perez-
Funez v. District Dir., INS, 619 F. Supp. 656 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (illegal alien minors have a
substantial liberty interest in being accorded various procedural rights guaranteed in
deportation hearings).
7 1. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34, quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154
(1945).
72. 459 U.S. at 34.
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this interest may lead to the loss of "all that makes life worth liv-
ing." 73 The marital preferences embedded in the INA are in a sense
constructed to minimize the possibility of such losses, and in recog-
nition of the weighty personal interests at stake for the individual
and the couple. Indeed, a marital preference often spells the differ-
ence between deportation or years of waiting in a foreign land and
the more immediate unification of the family. Moreover, gay do-
mestic relationships as well as heterosexual marriages can meet the
same core individual needs for companionship and stability. Not
one iota of evidence suggests that an INS-forced disruption of a gay
domestic relationship would cause any less suffering and depriva-
tion to the individuals involved than would similar interference with
a heterosexual marriage. In both cases, the integrity of the couple
as well as the welfare of the individuals - and perhaps their chil-
dren - is at stake.
74
In addition, gay domestic relationships are substantially more like
the conventional heterosexual marriage than are the non-conven-
tional heterosexual marriages recognized by the INS. Unlike the
couples in many heterosexual proxy or customary marriages, for ex-
ample, gay domestic partners cohabit and share in the management
of a single household, activities traditionally associated with the
term "marriage." It is illogical to deny this viable domestic unit a
chance to continue to function while recognizing unions in which
the two individuals may live apart for many years. 75
If gay and heterosexual persons are similarly situated with regard
to their interest in immigration preference status, then a policy of
unequal treatment can only be justified if the government's interest
outweighs the interest of the adversely affected individuals. In de-
termining what level of judicial scrutiny to apply in balancing these
competing interests, the courts choose among three tests: strict
scrutiny, rational basis, and intermediate scrutiny. The latter is the
most appropriate for determining the validity of discrimination
against gay domestic relationships for immigration purposes.
73. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). As Professor Tribe notes, "vir-
tually every intrusion upon an association works a displacement of personality." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 974 (1978).
74. One likely rationale for the validation of customary and tribal marriages is that
they receive religious, if not state, sanction. However, some denominations, such as the
Metropolitan Community Church, and some individual ministers and rabbis also per-
form gay marriage ceremonies.
75. See Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978) (INS not permitted to consider
separate living arrangement of couple as per se proof of a "dead" marriage) and cases




Strict scrutiny, the most exacting standard, requires the govern-
ment to prove a "compelling" interest for enacting legislation that
either disables a "suspect class" or burdens the exercise of a
fundamental right.76 Indicia of suspectness include "immutable"
characteristics such as race and national origin. 77 Suspect status will
also be accorded to groups "saddled with such disabilities, or sub-
ject to such a history of purposefully unequal treatment, or rele-
gated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
• ..protection from the majoritarian political process." 78 Legisla-
tion subject to this exacting standard almost always falls. However,
for purposes of federal equal protection analysis, and despite con-
siderable criticism, 79 the courts have held that neither gay persons
80
nor aliens8 ' constitute a suspect class.
If strict scrutiny is not appropriate in this instance, however,
neither is its opposite, the not "wholly irrational" 82 or "rational ba-
sis"83 test. Under these rubrics, almost any explanation that is not
totally bizarre will serve to justify upholding government actions
against individual or group interests. 84 Courts have often applied
this standard to immigration cases, reasoning that immigration pol-
icy raises purely political questions (that is, issues properly left to a
76. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 73, at 1000-1003.
77. Id. at 1000-1002.
78. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
79. For aliens, see Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the
National Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 275, 317-20; D. WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE 251-58 (1984). For gay persons, see J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRUST 162-64 (1980); L. TRIBE, supra note 73, at at 941-46; Note, The Constitutional Status
of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuals as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L.R. 1285 (1985); see
also Bowers v. Hardwick, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4923-4929 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) and Row-
land v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. at 1014 (Brennan, J., memorandum dis-
senting from denial of certiorari).
80. Bowers v. Hardwick, 54 U.S.L.W. 4919, rehg denied 55 U.S.L.W. 3228 (1986);
National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (1984), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 53 U.S.L.W. 4408 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1985); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388 (D.D.C. 1984); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975), aff'd mem, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
81. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). Cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (aliens a "suspect class" for purposes of fourteenth amendment analysis).
82. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957
(1980) (upholding revocation of student visas for Iranian nationals as part of govern-
ment's strategy to cope with "hostage crisis").
83. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (INA provision preventing fathers of illegiti-
mate alien children from claiming relative preference for them not unconstitutional).
The INA was recently amended to eliminate this provision, see supra note 7.
84. Cf Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1973) (no rational basis for statutory re-
striction on Veterans Administration educational benefits discriminating between con-
scientious objectors who performed required alternative civil service and veterans who
had been on active duty).
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coordinate branch of government), 85 or correlatively that such poli-
cies are a necessary adjunct of Congress' largely unreviewable
power to shape foreign policy. 86 However, where no clearly identifi-
able foreign policy issues are at stake, as in the case of validating gay
domestic relationships for immigration purposes, the latter argu-
ment loses its force.87 The "political question" rationale is also
problematic, for since gay persons and aliens have been and con-
tinue to be systematically barred from participation in the
majoritarian political process, decisions by the judiciary to leave the
legal fate of such groups almost entirely in the hands of the "coordi-
nate branches" itself seems an abdication of responsibility. 8
The appropriate level ofjudicial scrutiny to apply to the INS' cur-
rent policy is intermediate scrutiny. As its name implies, intermedi-
ate scrutiny is neither as demanding on the government as strict
scrutiny, nor as obsequious as the rational basis standard. It re-
quires that classification "may fairly be viewed as furthering a sub-
stantial interest of the State," 89 and that it "rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced be treated
85. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 324 U.S. 580 (1952); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding power of Congress to
exclude alien Communists).
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due co-
ordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from mul-
tifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
86. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.D.C.
1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 957 (1980); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S, 88 (1976).
A. Aleinikoff and D.A. Martin enumerate the many constitutional clauses that have
been held to justify broad congressional power over immigration. These include the
Commerce Power, the War Power, the Migration and Importation Clause, and the For-
eign Affairs Power. Another often-repeated rationale concerns inherent sovereign
power. A. ALEINIKOFF & D.A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 14-16 (1985).
The Supremacy Clause also has been cited to justify federal preemptive power over im-
migration, see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 350 (1975).
87. Cf. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 800-816 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 717-18, passini
(1985). See also Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. Civ. RTs.-CIv. LIBERTIES L. REV
269 (1975).
89. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 217-18.
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alike." 90 This "middle-tier" 9 ' approach permits the court "to evalu-




Intermediate scrutiny is proper where legislation, though not nec-
essarily of itself invidious, "nonetheless give[s] rise to recurring
constitutional difficulties." ' 93 This level of scrutiny will be triggered
for legislation that burdens important, though not fundamental
rights and/or a "sensitive" group, that is, a group that, while not
necessarily "discrete and insular," is nevertheless quite likely to be
"injured by law." 9 4 As may be obvious, intermediate scrutiny is a
fluid, if not porous, concept. To date it has been applied to group
classifications as diverse as gender,9 5 age,9 6 illegitimacy 9 7 and alien-
age, both legal and illegal, 9 8 and to such important interests as em-
ployment,9 9 education' 0 0 and family unity.' 0 ' Predicting which laws
or regulations will trigger intermediate scrutiny is thus difficult.'
0 2
However, the jurisprudence on intermediate scrutiny of gender
classifications provides the most fully developed articulation of the
issue and serves as an important guideline.
In Craig v. Boren, 10 3 the Supreme Court explained that gender-
based legislation is apt to be motivated by "archaic and over-
broad"'1 4 generalizations, thus making heightened judicial scrutiny
necessary. The case involved an Oklahoma law, purportedly en-
90. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quotingfrom Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
91. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 191, 211 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
92. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16.
93. 457 U.S. at 217.
94. L. TRIBE, supra note 73, at 1090.
95. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra. 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
96. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977).
97. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Lalli v. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259 (1978).
98. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); and Perez-Funez v. District
Dir., INS, 619 F. Supp 656 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
99. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (prohibiting rule requiring pregnant teachers to take leave of
absence after fourth month of pregnancy).
100. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981).
101. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidation of city ordi-
nance prohibiting grandparents from residing with grandchildren in particular zoning
area); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidation of statute presumptively bar-
ring award of custody to fathers of illegitimate children).
102. See generally Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of
Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1984).
103. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
104. 429 U.S. at 198, quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
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acted to reduce the number of accidents caused by teen drunk driv-
ing, that established gender-based differentials for the minimum
drinking age. Despite the impressive array of statistics marshalled
by the State, the justices were simply unwilling, absent some clearly
remedial purpose, 10 5 to sanction "the use of sex as a decisionmak-
ing factor."'' 0 6 Indeed, they opined that the empirical research itself
probably reflected the researchers' own gender biases and that of
the society at large. 10 7 In other words, the Court was unwilling to
validate regulations that further entrenched majoritarian prejudices
by singling out a group for disadvantageous treatment in a way that
did little or nothing to advance legitimate government interests.
Had the Court been applying rational basis scrutiny, it would have
accepted the government's explanation and statistics at face value as
rationally justifying the law as it stood. Had the Court been apply-
ing strict scrutiny, it would have rejected the government's ration-
ale, even if that rationale were backed by more solid evidence, as
insufficiently compelling.
Given the constitutional principles enunciated in Craig, an INS
policy denying spousal benefits to gay domestic partners also man-
dates intermediate scrutiny. Just as Oklahoma's drinking law had its
true foundation in the stereotyping assumption that teen-aged boys
were inherently incapable of exercising the same good judgment as
teen-aged girls, the INS' position on gay domestic relationships im-
plicitly adopts and legitimates the stereotype that gay persons are
inherently emotionally incapable of entering into genuine domestic
relationships, perhaps because they are inherently "sick" or "im-
moral."' 0 8 Both forms of discrimination are "based on archaic and
overbroad assumptions about... relative needs and capacities" and
each "deprives persons of their individual dignity" and thereby vio-
lates principles of equal protection.' 09 For both, some form of
105. 429 U.S. at 190.
106. 429 U.S. at 202.
107. 429 U.S. at 201-03 and nn.14, 16.
108. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. at 1123; see also Hardwick v. Bowers, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4922 (Burger, J., concurring).
109. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625. Denying the validity of gay
domestic relationships for immigration purposes may well be devastating to the per-
sonal integrity of the individuals involved and to the integrity of the couple. For in-
stance, such a policy might force the couple to make the agonizing choice between
maintaining their emotionally central relationship by forced relocation (which in any
event may not be possible) or by circumvention of the immigration laws, or dissolving
the relationship. Application of this choice to heterosexual married couples would be
unthinkable. Yet it seems equally unconscionable when applied to gay couples who are




heightened scrutiny is therefore appropriate to ensure that the tar-
get groups are not subject to the whims of legislators' prejudices.
This is especially true for gay citizens seeking relationship prefer-
ence for alien domestic partners. These persons are victims of
multi-layered discrimination. They suffer discrimination under the
immigration laws, which stigmatize all gay persons as diseased and
unworthy, and under domestic social and legislative assumptions
that they are incapable of forming close familial relationships - the
very thing the law refuses to recognize. Surely gay persons handi-
capped by the immigration laws are denied "their individual dig-
nity" in a way that merits not merely cursory judicial attention but
intermediate scrutiny. 1
0
In defending a policy that refuses to recognize gay domestic rela-
tionships as valid for immigration purposes, the government - in
this case, the INS - might assert the following closely interrelated
interests: (1) the importance of preventing a large influx of gay
aliens into the country, (2) the need to prevent sham marriages, (3)
the need to protect family life, and (4) the need to protect the na-
tion's morals.
The government would probably claim that refusing to validate
gay domestic relationships is a way to enforce INA § 212(a)(4), now
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), which, following Boutillier, excludes all gay
aliens from the country. This reasoning has several flaws. First,
there are more direct ways to accomplish this end, namely better
border enforcement. As Justice Brennan noted in Plyler v. Doe, a
case involving intermediate scrutiny, the INS cannot use its own fail-
ures of enforcement to justify unlawful discrimination against those
who thereby enter the country."' Moreover, despite the INS'
protestations to the contrary, evidence suggests that the agency is
not committed to effecting a meaningful gay exclusion. In the pe-
riod 1971-83, the last date for which figures are available, only forty-
requiring them to make these forced choices significantly impinges on individual liber-
ties in ways that offend notions of fundamental fairness.
110. According to Professor Tribe:
If a rule is embedded in a setting characterized by institutional rigidity to change, so
that shifting social and moral norms are less likely to be reflected in modifications of
the rule, the propriety and probability of intermediate scrutiny will be increased.
L. TRIBE, supra note 73, at 1091. The INA has historically been heavily resistant to ma-
jor change, as the long delay in passage of the current amendments attests, and the INS
is an entrenched bureaucracy that places a high value on conservative interpretations of
rules and regulations. Lecture by Doris Meisner, former Acting Commissioner, INS;
lecture in Immigration Law and Policy Seminar, Prof. Peter Schuck, Yale Law School
(May 1, 1986).
11. 457 U.S. at 218.
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four of the tens of millions of persons who entered the country were
excluded for being "immoral," and these figures do not indicate
how many such persons were so excluded for being gay.' 1 2
Second, the government may assert that validating gay domestic
relationships for immigration purposes would encourage large
numbers of aliens to attempt to circumvent the immigration laws by
entering into sham domestic arrangements in the hopes of ob-
taining easy access to citizenship or legal permanent resident status.
Since relative preference status confers so many benefits for immi-
gration purposes, the potential for sham arrangements undertaken
solely for purposes of circumventing the INA is enormous. Sham
marriages, however, are expressly prohibited by the INA under 8
U.S.C. 1251(c) and by the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments of 1986, and the INS tries vigorously to detect such fraud.
Even under the recent Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments, a
policy recognizing gay domestic relationships for immigration pur-
poses would not be substantially more difficult to enforce against
sham marriages than is the policy recognizing traditional heterosex-
ual marriages. 1 3 Moreover, the proposed policy change might actu-
ally reduce the number of sham marriages. Under the current
regime, gay nonimmigrant aliens who wish to remain in this country
sometimes enter into sham marriages with a gay or heterosexual
person of the opposite sex. 14 A policy validating gay marriages for
immigration purposes would certainly reduce the number of these
sham marriages by permitting gay aliens to immigrate legitimately
through their own domestic relationships.
Third, the government might well argue that the relational bene-
fits conferred by the statute were clearly meant only for heterosex-
ual couples, and that to accord such benefits to gay couples would
destroy or at least weaken the strong pro-family orientation of the
INA. Certainly, the government might well be able to articulate a
strong interest in preserving family life. However, disadvantaging
gay persons is not the least restrictive route to that objective.1 5 Re-
search has shown that laws suppressing gay activity do not propel
many gay people into heterosexual marriage, and that marriages
112. 1983 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SER-
VICE, supra note 37, Table ENF 2.1 at 193.
113. See also infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
114. Vaid Interview, supra note 5; telephone interview with Paula Ettelbrick, Staff
Attorney, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Foundation, New York, New York
(Nov. 6, 1986). No INS official with whom I spoke would venture a guess as to whether
enforcement would be more difficult with gay persons.




that gay persons undertake hoping to be "cured" of their homosex-
uality almost always fail, causing a great deal of pain to both mar-
riage partners.' 16  Conversely, since homosexuality is not
contagious, a tolerance of gay committed relationships for immigra-
tion purposes would hardly send heterosexual innocents running
from the altar. States and municipalities that have strong gay rights
bills have reported no such flight. Perhaps most importantly, as one
commentator notes, "homosexuality poses a threat only to the for-
mal definitions of marriage and the family, not necessarily to the
values of caring and responsibility that lie behind them. Perhaps a
broader conception of family is necessary to preserve the intimacy
and sharing that are the central objects of the state's concern."' 7
Indeed, using the "family unity" rationale, it might be difficult for
the government to justify granting immigration spousal benefits to
heterosexual couples who do not plan to have children while deny-
ing them to gay couples who already have children.
The Congress that passed the 1952 Act of course was not thinking
in such expansive terms. It operated in an era when society knew
much less about homosexuality, and relied on professional assess-
ments that have been widely repudiated in subsequent years. 1 8
Since the INA allows, and the INS has shown, flexibility in meeting
the requirements of changing social standards, the issue that re-
mains is why the INS has been so inflexible with respect to gay per-
sons. Does the government's interest in privileging only
heterosexual couples create community benefits that outweigh the
harm done to the affected gay couples? Hard facts rather than hard-
ened prejudices will have to be advanced to make that case. It
seems unlikely that the government could successfully advance such
a claim.
Finally, the federal government might assert that it has a compel-
ling interest in protecting the nation's morals that any concession to
gay persons would thwart. Even allowing that the federal govern-
ment has a right to determine the moral as well as the social and
economic policies of the nation, it is still questionable whether the
INS' current, very selective policy of morality will effectuate such a
goal. It is difficult to articulate cogent reasons, for example, for al-
lowing the family ties of a heterosexual alien smuggler or drug
116. See C.A. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX 249-50 (1975).
117. Note, supra note 79, at 1307.
118. See HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL, supra note 37; A.P. BELL
& M.S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN
(1978); D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED (1977); C.A. TRIPP, supra note 116.
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dealer to be given great weight in immigration proceedings" t9 while
those of a noncriminal gay alien who only wishes to establish a sta-
ble home with a legal resident or citizen are given no weight whatso-
ever. Again, if homosexual activity is not always treated as per se
"bad" moral character for purposes of obtaining citizenship, 20 why
is it treated as a per se instance of unacceptable morality in the con-
text of gay domestic relationships for immigration purposes?
In short, no substantial government interest seems strong enough
to outweigh the real and often compelling interests gay persons
have in obtaining a preference status for domestic partners. In the
context of the INS' support of heterosexual marriages, its refusal to
recognize gay domestic relationships for immigration purposes fails
to survive the intermediate level of scrutiny that should be required
for such discriminatory classification.
IV. Proposal. A Gay Domestic Relationship Status for Immigration
Purposes
For immigration purposes only, the INS should establish a quasi-
marital preference status for gay persons in domestic relationships.
INS regulations can be amended to achieve this goal while remain-
ing within the framework of current immigration laws.
INS regulations now require that a marriage valid for immigration
purposes must (1) be valid in the state (or country) in which it was
celebrated and (2) not have been undertaken merely to circumvent
the immigration laws. 12 t The proposed change in INS regulations
ensures the validity of domestic relationships for immigration pur-
poses while remaining substantially within the boundaries of the
present test. The INS should leave the test unaltered for cases in-
volving male-female arrangements. For gay persons, the first prong
of the test could be met by filing a Statement of Relationship Form
with the INS (or a Dissolution form, where appropriate). Such a
form, modeled on the domestic partnership agreements in effect in
some municipalities, 122 would establish a quasi-marital domestic re-
119. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) and statutory provisions cited
supra note 13.
120. See cases cited supra note 40.
121. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d at 1038. The Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986, supra note 7, § 2, add the following third criterion as INA
§ 216(d)(1)(A)(II): "[the marriage] has not been judicially annulled or terminated,
other than through the death of a spouse" during the two-year conditional period.




lationship status for immigration purposes. 123 As in domestic rela-
tionship documents recognized elsewhere, the form would have to
be sworn to and notarized. In order to prevent fraud, persons filing
such documents could be subjected to the same two-year condi-
tional period and to the same waiting period following dissolution
before claiming preference status for a second alien domestic part-
ner as those to which heterosexual persons are now subject. The
second prong of the test would not have to be changed. A gay
couple claiming the domestic relationship status would bear sub-
stantially the same burden of proving the genuineness of the rela-
tionship as that borne by heterosexual couples claiming the marital
preference. 124
Four practical and political effects of the proposed policy change
seem the most problematic: enforcement, fraud detection, privacy
and federalism. The proposal could be implemented in ways that
effectively address each of these concerns.
The INS employee most responsible for determining the validity
of a gay domestic relationship would be the Examiner. The Exam-
iner has the task of subjectively assessing the genuineness of the re-
lationship. Enforcement of this task might prove especially difficult
for gay domestic relationships because Examiners may not be aware
of how to assess these relationships properly. Moreover, INS Exam-
iners are not renowned for their sensitivity to other cultures and
lifestyles. 125 To a large extent, recruitment and training policies
within the INS account for this phenomenon. 12 6 Examiners are gen-
erally recruited from within the Service. Many begin as clerks (with
or without college degrees) and receive promotions through the
ranks based on length of service and performance reviews of prior
assignments that may not have involved skills needed by an effective
Examiner. Examiners receive two weeks of basic training at the INS
school in Florida. Thereafter, on-the-job continuing education sem-
123. The concept of a quasi-marital status for gay persons is presented in Note,
Honosexuals' Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Sohtion, supra note 47, at
213-15. But see Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, supra note 47, at 588-89 (quasi-
marital status is less-than-equal to marital status). For an example of domestic partner-
ship legislation allowing gay persons certain spousal privileges, see City of Berkeley,
California, Domestic Partnership Policy, Statement of General Policy, Dec. 4, 1984.
124. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
125. The need for additional "training in human relations" for INS officers has been
recognized in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL
RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION, Findings and Recommendations 3.2, at 43 (1980); see
also id. at 39 (INS decisions often based on racial and ethnic prejudices).
126. The following information on sham marriages was obtained in interviews in
New York City withJill Dufresne, INS Assistant District Counsel, New York, in New York
City (May 5, 1986), and Peterson Interview, supra note 19.
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inars are optional, although Supervising Examiners may strongly
advise an Examiner to attend a seminar in an area in which she or he
is weak. Nevertheless, Examiners are not trained to be sensitive to
cultural or other differences regarding marital arrangements. 27
Clearly, then, any formal INS procedure for examining the valid-
ity of gay domestic relationship claims might well meet with Examin-
ers' confusion, uncertainty, or even hostility. Some supplemental
training of Examiners and Supervisory Examiners will undoubtedly
be necessary to address homophobia among investigators and to
alert them to any special issues regarding gay domestic relationships
of which they might need to be aware in order to make fair and
accurate determinations. Such training need not entail an undue fi-
nancial burden on the INS, since it probably could be provided free
of charge and on an as-needed basis. For example, training could
be offered either within the INS school or in local offices by gay
rights educational groups skilled in conducting such sessions in gov-
ernmental and institutional contexts.' 28 Nothing suggests that
these changes will be easy to effect. Yet the magnitude of the indi-
vidual interests involved justifies the degree of administrative incon-
venience.' 29 Significantly, the courts on other occasions have
ordered the INS to undertake additional administrative work to
safeguard individual rights and interests. 30
The proposed policy change also would not hamper investigation
and detection of sham marital arrangements. Under current policy,
a citizen or legal permanent resident alien seeking a change in immi-
gration status for his or her spouse first fills out and files Form I-
130, Petition to Classify Status of Alien Relative for Issuance of
Visa. This form must be accompanied by relevant documents, in-
cluding birth certificates, photographs, and marriage certificates -
or, if documentation is not available, sworn affidavits by two persons
127. For instance, I was informed by the Supervisory Immigration Examiner of the
New York City office of the INS that among the nonverbal cues that Examiners are
trained to look for are whether the couple touch or look at each other during the inter-
view. When I pointed out to her that in some cultures a couple would never do either in
the presence of strangers, the Supervisory Examiner acknowledged that the Examiners
were not trained to account for such variations. Peterson Interview, supra note 19.
128. See Current Topic, Gay Youth and the Right to Education, 4 YALE L. & POL'y REV.
446, 447 n.4 (1986) (gay rights activists working with Philadelphia Superintendent of
Schools to develop solutions to antigay violence among public school students).
129. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 656.




"who were living at the time and who have personal knowledge of
the event."'
13
Once the petition is approved, the couple is scheduled for an in-
terview with an INS Examiner. The interviewer, during a session
lasting from twenty to thirty minutes, seeks to uncover any evidence
of sham marriage - that is, tries to determine whether the marriage
would have existed but for the immigration laws. Petitioners must
bring to the examination any documents to support their claim, in-
cluding personal letters, photographs, insurance policies, leases,
phone bills, and bank statements. In addition, the Examiner usually
asks the couple questions about their life together. While these
questions today rarely entail probing into the details of the couple's
sex life, they might include such queries as: "What color is your
spouse's toothbrush?" "What did your spouse eat for breakfast to-
day?" Vast differences in age, cultural background, or education
between the marriage partners make Examiners particularly suspi-
cious. Couples are generally questioned together, but if the Exam-
iner is especially doubtful of the marriage's genuineness, he or she
might question each member of the couple individually. (A lawyer
may be present throughout the proceedings, but may not coach her
or his client).1
3 2
To trained Examiners, some marriages seem blatantly sham. In
these cases, spouses might even be given separate tape-recorded in-
terviews. In addition, a separate investigation of the marriage claim
may be conducted by the investigative office of the INS, which func-
tions independently of other offices. Investigations by this office are
usually triggered by anonymous tips and may involve interviews
with employers, neighbors, and other knowledgeable people.
This brief outline of the INS's investigative techniques for sham
marriage demonstrates that, provided some formal procedure exists
131. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, INS, Form 1-130, Petition to Classify Status of Alien Rela-
tive for Issuance of Immigrant Visa, Instructions 3(c)(4). The Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986, supra note 7, alter this procedure for couples claiming pref-
erence status within 24 months of marriage by requiring an interview after a two-year
conditional period as a prerequisite for obtaining full legal permanent resident alien
status. Regulations and operating instructions for these interviews have yet to be
promulgated. The language of the Amendments suggests that considerable documen-
tary evidence of the marriage's ongoing viability will be required, and production of
residence and employment records is specifically mandated. However, the structure,
and certainly the function, of the two-year interview is unlikely to be markedly different
from the current initial interview.
132. The grapevine among aspiring immigrants and immigration lawyers is appar-
ently quite efficient, and a good deal of pre-examination coaching occurs. For this rea-
son, the INS Examiners try never to ask stock questions, and to change frequently the
questions they ask. Peterson Interview, supra note 19.
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to validate gay domestic relationships for immigration purposes,
sham gay domestic relationships should not be substantially more
difficult to detect than sham heterosexual marriages. Presumably
the gay couple will be able to produce ample documentary evidence
of functioning as a couple and to answer questions about each
other's personal habits and tastes.
One must also consider the impact of the proposed policy change
on gay people's right to privacy. "Right to privacy" here means not
simply the right to same-sex intimate associations but the vaunted
"right to be let alone."' 133 Because gay people still face widespread
discrimination - in courts, in the workplace, and in society at large
- many more choose to remain "in the closet" than to "come out."
For those who wish to keep their sexual orientation a purely private
matter, any procedure entailing public acknowledgment of their gay
identity might seem particularly threatening. Indeed, in the case of
validating gay domestic relationships for immigration purposes,
many gay couples may see the choice between suffering the hardship
of separation and suffering through an investigative interview (and
perhaps a court proceeding) as nearly equivalent, or as no real
choice at all. Yet the INS clearly has a right to adequate disclosure
from the couple.
No easy solution to this dilemma is possible. However, by work-
ing with liaisons from the gay communities, the INS might develop
guidelines for a "least intrusive" method of investigating the validity
of gay domestic relationships for immigration purposes. Many state
and local governments currently maintain liaisons with gay rights
advocacy groups, as they do with other interest groups. The INS
itself maintains liaisons with special advocacy groups representing a
variety of religious, ethnic, and government interests. 134 Together
the INS and representatives of the gay communities could devise an
effective plan that would enable the maximum number of gay
couples who qualified for the domestic relationship benefit to obtain
it while preserving the efficiency of the INS' procedures for investi-
gating sham marriages and keeping accurate records.
Traditionally, the regulation of marriage and morals has rested
squarely within the ambit of the state's police power. The above
proposal would not disturb this balance. No state would be com-
pelled to recognize "gay marriage." States proscribing homosexual
133. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).





sodomy would still be free to enforce that proscription against any
alien-citizen gay couple that should choose to reside there. The
proposal would simply allow the federal government to exercise its
acknowledged prerogative to formulate uniform immigration poli-
cies and regulations, even in the area of domestic relations and
morals. It would therefore affirm this prerogative without imper-
missibly disregarding the principles of comity and federalism.
Conclusion
Gay "married" couples require the same protection from immi-
gration laws that heterosexual married couples require and obtain.
By refusing to recognize any form of gay domestic relationship as
valid for immigration purposes, the INS violates the gay couple's
rights to equal protection. As the number of openly gay couples
and families increases, and as these arrangements receive growing
societal acceptance, the inequity of the INS policy will become ever
more pronounced. Validating gay domestic relationships for immi-
gration purposes would entail no undue burden for the INS. Re-
fusal to validate, on the other hand, places intolerable burdens on
gay couples.
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